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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2023
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[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Volume:] 14 [Issue:] 3 [Article No.:] 37 [Year:] 2023 [Pages:] 1-19
Verlag: 
MDPI, Basel
Zusammenfassung: 
In transportation networks, incomplete information is ubiquitous, and users often delegate their route choice to distributed route planners. To model and study these systems, we introduce network control games, consisting of multiple actors seeking to optimise the social welfare of their assigned subpopulations through resource allocation in an underlying nonatomic congestion game. We first analyse the inefficiency of the routing equilibria by calculating the Price of Anarchy for polynomial cost functions, and then, using an Asynchronous Advantage Actor-Critic algorithm implementation, we show that reinforcement learning agents are vulnerable to choosing suboptimal routing as predicted by the theory. Finally, we extend the analysis to allow vehicles to choose their route planner and study the associated equilibria. Our results can be applied to mitigate inefficiency issues arising in large transport networks with route controlled autonomous vehicles.
Schlagwörter: 
resource allocation
congestion games
multi-agent learning
efficiency
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