Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/329994 
Year of Publication: 
2022
Citation: 
[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Volume:] 13 [Issue:] 6 [Article No.:] 83 [Year:] 2022 [Pages:] 1-11
Publisher: 
MDPI, Basel
Abstract: 
We investigate observed rent dissipation-the ratio of the total costs of rent seeking to the monetary value of the rent-in winner-take-all and share contests, where preferences are more general than usually assumed in the literature. With concave valuation of the rent, we find that contests can exhibit observed over-dissipation if the contested rent is below a threshold and yet observed under-dissipation with large rents: the nature of preferences implies contestants are relatively effortful in contesting small rents. Considering more general preferences in contests thus allows us to reconcile the Tullock paradox-where rent-seeking levels are relatively small despite the contested rent being sizeable-with observed over-dissipation of rents in experimental settings, where contested rents are arguably small.
Subjects: 
rent seeking
rent dissipation
Tullock contests
JEL: 
C72
D72
H40
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
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