Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/329985 
Year of Publication: 
2022
Citation: 
[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Volume:] 13 [Issue:] 6 [Article No.:] 74 [Year:] 2022 [Pages:] 1-32
Publisher: 
MDPI, Basel
Abstract: 
We experimentally investigated the effects of the possibility of taking in the dictator game and the choices of passive players between the dictator game and the taking game on the distribution decisions of active players. Our main findings support our hypothesis: when the dictator game is not exogenously given but chosen by the receivers (or passive players), this makes them accountable, which leads to less giving by dictators. We also conducted an online survey to gain further insights about our experimental results. Survey participants predicted most of the observed behavior in the experiment and explained the factors that might have driven the predicted behavior using reasoning similar to ours. Our results provide a new perspective for the dependence of giving in the dictator game on contextual factors.
Subjects: 
accountability
dictator game
endogenous game choice
experimental economics
taking behavior
JEL: 
C83
C90
D64
D90
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
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