Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/329975 
Year of Publication: 
2022
Citation: 
[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Volume:] 13 [Issue:] 5 [Article No.:] 64 [Year:] 2022 [Pages:] 1-20
Publisher: 
MDPI, Basel
Abstract: 
We study two-sided matching contests with two sets, A and B, each of which includes a finite number of heterogeneous agents with commonly known types. The agents in each set compete in a lottery (Tullock) contest, and then are assortatively matched, namely, the winner of set A is matched with the winner of set B and so on until all the agents in the set with the smaller number of agents are matched. Each agent has a match value that depends on their own type and the type of their match. We assume that the agents' efforts do not affect their match values and that they have a positive effect on welfare. Therefore, an interior equilibrium in which at least some of the agents are active is welfare superior to a corner equilibrium in which the agents choose to be non-active. We analyze the conditions under which there exists a (partial) interior equilibrium where at least some of the agents compete against each other and exert positive efforts.
Subjects: 
two-sided matching
Tullock contest
JEL: 
D44
J31
D72
D82
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
Appears in Collections:

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.