Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/329973 
Year of Publication: 
2022
Citation: 
[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Volume:] 13 [Issue:] 5 [Article No.:] 62 [Year:] 2022 [Pages:] 1-14
Publisher: 
MDPI, Basel
Abstract: 
We study asymmetric second-price auctions under incomplete information. The bidders have two potentially different, commonly known, valuations for the object and private information about their entry costs. The seller, however, does not benefit from these entry costs. We calculate the equilibrium strategies of the bidders and analyze the optimal design for the seller in this environment in terms of expected entry and the number of potential bidders.
Subjects: 
asymmetric auctions
entry costs
JEL: 
D44
O31
O32
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
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