Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/328209 
Year of Publication: 
2025
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 18079
Publisher: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Abstract: 
We examine the role that racial discrimination plays in the decision to retain or release an employee. Our empirical setting allows us to separate the retention decision from the wage decision. For the first four years of a player's career, wages are mechanically determined and players are under a restricted 'rookie' contract, during which they can be released without cost. Players who survive in the league beyond four years receive a large uptick in their remuneration upon signing their first 'free-agency' contract. Consequently, marginal decisions over employment retention during the rookie contract have substantial implications for earnings realised over a player's career. We find subtle but significant differences in retention rates between Black and White players (approximately 3 percentage points) that can't be explained by a comprehensive set of individual characteristics including their productivity. We also show that traditional wage gap estimates, which appear to show equal earnings between Black and White players conditional upon playing position and productivity, mask underlying disparities in career earnings that become apparent when adjusting for these unequal retention rates.
Subjects: 
discrimination
wages
retention
JEL: 
J71
J31
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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