Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/328051 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2025
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ILE Working Paper Series No. 86
Verlag: 
University of Hamburg, Institute of Law and Economics (ILE), Hamburg
Zusammenfassung: 
Populist governance is fundamentally at odds with constitutionalism. As a political project, populism rejects constraints on "the will of the people," including those essential to liberal-democratic constitutions. Yet, the extent to which elected populists actually undermine constitutional order remains contested. This article presents the first empirical analysis of whether constitutional compliance declines following the electoral success of populist parties in parliament and government. Using novel indicators of party populism and constitutional compliance, we find that the entry of populists into government leads to an erosion of constitutional norms, while their mere parliamentary presence has no systematic effect. This negative impact is primarily driven by a weakening of political and civil rights. Our results further show that populist parties-as distinct from individual leaders-are the primary drivers of noncompliance, and that the ideological orientation of these parties predicts the extent of their threat to constitutional order.
Schlagwörter: 
Populism
constitutional compliance
constitutionalism
political ideology
rule of law
JEL: 
D72
D78
K38
K42
P16
P26
P37
P48
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
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