Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/327439 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Citation: 
[Journal:] Journal of Innovation & Knowledge (JIK) [ISSN:] 2444-569X [Volume:] 9 [Issue:] 4 [Article No.:] 100536 [Year:] 2024 [Pages:] 1-13
Publisher: 
Elsevier, Amsterdam
Abstract: 
Government intention to spur innovation can result in the proliferation of low-quality patents, which is especially pronounced in countries with a low level of government accountability. This study examines the paradoxical effects of government-funded innovation in weakly institutionalized environments. I offer a game-theoretic model, in which the government has a stake in technological development and invests in research and development, although this encourages the growth of low-quality patents. Using Russian patents data between 1998 and 2016, I illustrate this mechanism by demonstrating the causal impact of Russia's government policy, which resulted in a simultaneous increase in the number of patents and a decrease in the absolute number of high-quality patents in the patent pool. This study provides a theoretical background for evaluating the impact of political incentives for investing in the creation of new technologies in the technological development of countries.
Subjects: 
Patents
Corruption
Government R&D policy
JEL: 
O32
O33
O38
O43
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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