Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/325072 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2025
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 18014
Verlag: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
While extensive research on unemployment insurance (UI) has examined how benefits affect workers' job search, little is known about how eligibility conditions shape firms' hiring decisions. These conditions, often requiring a minimum work history, affect the value workers place on contracts meeting the eligibility threshold. Exploiting a French reform that modified these requirements after 2009, we show that firms internalize workers' preferences and adjust contract durations to align with the new threshold. This reveals an overlooked ex-ante mechanism, where firms respond to UI incentives when posting vacancies–before meeting workers–rather than only through ex post adjustments. This response shifts contract duration distributions, also affecting workers already eligible for UI. Our findings have two implications: first, UI shapes firms' behavior at the vacancy stage, influencing job creation decisions ex ante, not just separation decisions ex post; second, UI eligibility conditions generate significant spillover effects.
Schlagwörter: 
firm behavior
employment duration
unemployment insurance
temporary employment
JEL: 
J08
J64
J65
H32
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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