Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/325050 
Year of Publication: 
2025
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 17992
Publisher: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Abstract: 
This paper investigates whether the characteristics of locally elected officials influenced excess mortality during the COVID-19 pandemic. Using data on Italy, one of the first countries to be severely affected, we examine whether mayoral education influenced municipal-level mortality outcomes. We estimate weekly excess mortality using official death statistics and a Bayesian hierarchical spatio-temporal model. To address endogeneity in political selection, we implement a close-election Regression Discontinuity Design. We find that college-educated mayors significantly reduced mortality during the first wave of the pandemic, by lowering both the likelihood of excess deaths and the excess mortality rate. These effects are not observed in the second wave, likely due to policy convergence and a stronger role played by national and regional institutions. Our design interprets education as a proxy for broader leadership traits, such as decision-making capacity under uncertainty. The findings underscore that political selection can have real demographic consequences, shaping population outcomes during crises.
Subjects: 
regression discontinuity design
mortality
COVID-19
political selection
JEL: 
D72
J10
H75
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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