Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/323547 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2024
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Small Business Economics [ISSN:] 1573-0913 [Volume:] 64 [Issue:] 3 [Publisher:] Springer US [Place:] New York, NY [Year:] 2024 [Pages:] 1321-1359
Verlag: 
Springer US, New York, NY
Zusammenfassung: 
The high degree of asymmetric information in initial coin offerings (ICOs) increases the probability of moral hazard, adverse selection, and outright fraud. Token governance mechanisms may help mitigate such investment risks. Using novel data on token retention in the primary market and resale restrictions in the secondary market, we estimate the impact of these governance mechanisms on the fundraising success and post-funding performance of ICOs. First, we estimate the valuation elasticity of token retention, indicating that 10% fewer tokens sold increases the ICO funding amount by 3.2%. Second, restricting ICO investors’ ability to resell tokens in the secondary market has a detrimental impact on the 12-month buy-and-hold abnormal return. We also discuss contingency effects of the specific implementations of these governance signals and show that the effects are moderated by the quality of the venture’s human capital.
Schlagwörter: 
Initial coin offering (ICO)
Digital assets
Token allocation
Token issuance and resale restriction
Venture valuation and performance
JEL: 
G23
G24
L26
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Creative-Commons-Lizenz: 
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Dokumentart: 
Article
Dokumentversion: 
Published Version

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