Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/323537 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Citation: 
[Journal:] Review of Industrial Organization [ISSN:] 1573-7160 [Volume:] 66 [Issue:] 1 [Publisher:] Springer US [Place:] New York, NY [Year:] 2024 [Pages:] 71-88
Publisher: 
Springer US, New York, NY
Abstract: 
This article derives the optimal wholesale tariff that is proposed by the monopolistic manufacturer of a branded product to a monopolistic retailer if the retailer also sells a private label whose quality is unobserved by the brand manufacturer. The focus is on market-share contracts where the manufacturer controls the quantities of both products. To learn the quality of the private label and diminish the retailer’s information rent, it distorts the quantity of the branded product downwards and that of the private label upwards. The manufacturer can control the quantity of the private label if it combines an excess payment with an end-of-year repayment.
Subjects: 
Asymmetric information
Branded product
Market-share contract
Mechanism design
Private label product
JEL: 
D42
D82
L15
L42
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

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