Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/323195 
Year of Publication: 
2025
Citation: 
[Journal:] International Journal of Game Theory [ISSN:] 1432-1270 [Volume:] 54 [Issue:] 2 [Article No.:] 27 [Publisher:] Springer [Place:] Berlin, Heidelberg [Year:] 2025
Publisher: 
Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Abstract: 
Blending in with others is a possible self-serving motivation when people participate in cooperative situations. We use this motivation to formulate a corresponding fairness principle, combine it with rather weak standard axioms from cooperative game theory, and show that it leads to equal split of coalitional gains. The same normative principles characterize this solution when only cohesive games (where it is optimal for the coalition of all players to form) are considered.
Subjects: 
Blend-in fairness
Cohesive games
Cooperative games
Equal division solution
JEL: 
A13
C71
D63
D91
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

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