Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/322232 
Year of Publication: 
2025
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper No. 15.2025
Publisher: 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milano
Abstract: 
This paper investigates how concurrent national and local elections affect the local political participation and competition. Leveraging a quasi-experimental framework provided by Italy's staggered electoral timing, the paper employs a difference-in-differences design. Estimates reveal that municipalities holding concurrent elections exhibit lower levels of local participation and competition. Moreover, the concurrent election increases participation by candidates with nationally-established parties, while decreases participation with independent parties. This further translates into a higher votes share for nationally-established parties and a consequent higher probability of election. Elected mayors tend to have lower education and experience in office, while they are more likely to be from the municipality they were elected in. Further, elected mayors are able to attract more intergovernmental transfers, without substantially affecting local spending patterns.
Subjects: 
Concurrent elections
Political Competition
Political Participation
JEL: 
D72
H70
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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