Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/32086
Authors: 
Helm, Carsten
Neugart, Michael
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
Darmstadt Discussion Papers in Economics 192
Abstract: 
With ideological parties being better informed about the state of the world than voters, the true motivation of policy proposals is hard to judge for the electorate. However, if reform proposals have to be agreed upon by coalition parties, it may become possible for the government to signal to the voters its private information about the necessity of reforms. Therefore, in coalition governments reforms will be more in line with policy requirements than in single-party governments. This is usually beneficial for the coalition parties as well as for the voter.
Subjects: 
Asymmetric information
coalition governments
policy reform
JEL: 
D72
D78
D82
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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