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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2005
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Darmstadt Discussion Papers in Economics No. 153
Verlag: 
Technische Universität Darmstadt, Department of Law and Economics, Darmstadt
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper analyzes liability issues in the context of internationally traded goods like hazardous waste. If waste disposers of a small open economy are judgement-proof, then the extension of liability to waste exporters distorts the factor allocation and may reduce disposal care. Hence the optimal extension is partial at most. However, extending liability increases incentives of the waste importing country to hold domestic disposers liable. Interaction through the price system and through contracts that condition payments for disposal services on the occurrence of an accident yield identical outcomes if disposers are judgement-proof.
Schlagwörter: 
extended liability
hazardous waste trade
externalities
moral hazard
JEL: 
K13
Q38
F18
D63
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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