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Erscheinungsjahr: 
1999
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
cege Discussion Papers No. 4
Verlag: 
University of Göttingen, Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research (cege), Göttingen
Zusammenfassung: 
In this paper we analyze the implications for the national provision of public inputs when pro t shifting is possible, albeit costly, for internationally integrated firms. In this case a high level of public infrastructure will attract real investment, but the rm can at least partly avoid to pay correspondingly high corporate taxes. In contrast to much of the recent literature on capital tax competition and public infrastructure provision we thus nd that public inputs will be unambiguously underprovided when the corporate tax falls only on pure pro ts and international taxation follows the source principle. Extensions of the basic model cover the case of distortive capital taxes and alternative international tax regimes.
JEL: 
H25
H54
H87
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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