Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/31980
Authors: 
Rincke, Johannes
Schwager, Robert
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
CeGE Discussion Paper 48
Abstract: 
Many welfare schemes discourage low skilled individuals from working. In the same time, there is widespread support for the welfare state among the highly educated. We suggest a model which explains these seemingly contrasting observations. In our approach, intergenerational social mobility is conditional on labour market participation of the parents. Such mobility increases the supply of high skilled labour in the next generation. To protect their children from the associated fall in wages, middle class parents have an incentive to induce unemployment among low skilled parents, and therefore vote for a social transfer.
Subjects: 
political preferences
unemployment
voting
social mobility
welfare state
JEL: 
H53
I38
D72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
314.67 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.