Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/319260 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2024
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Journal of Banking Regulation [ISSN:] 1750-2071 [Volume:] 26 [Issue:] 1 [Publisher:] Palgrave Macmillan [Place:] London [Year:] 2024 [Pages:] 1-24
Verlag: 
Palgrave Macmillan, London
Zusammenfassung: 
When a widespread funding shock hits the banking system, banks may engage in strategic behaviour to deal with funding shortages by a pre-emptive disposal of assets. Alternatively, they may adopt a more cautious strategy to mitigate price reactions, thereby distributing the assets sales into smaller portions over time. We model banks’ optimal behaviour using standard optimisation techniques and show that an equilibrium always exits in a stylised setting. A numerical analysis to approximate the equilibrium supplements the theoretical part. The implementation delivers two liquidity measures for the German banking system: the Systemic Liquidity Buffer and the Systemic Liquidity Shortfall. These measures are more informative about systemic liquidity risk than regulatory liquidity measures, such as the LCR, because they model adverse, nonlinear price dynamics in a more realistic way. Our approach is applied to different stress scenarios.
Schlagwörter: 
Systemic liquidity risk
Market liquidity
Funding liquidity
Contagion
Fire sales
JEL: 
C63
G01
G17
G21
G28
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Creative-Commons-Lizenz: 
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Dokumentart: 
Article
Dokumentversion: 
Published Version

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