Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/319066 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2025
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CFR Working Paper No. 25-03
Verlag: 
University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR), Cologne
Zusammenfassung: 
Certain institutional features of 401(k) plans can create conflicts of interest between plan participants and financial advisors that advise them. We study one such conflict: when advisors are affiliated with the plan's recordkeeper. Using a large dataset of 401(k) plans, we find that affiliated advisors reduce investment performance of participants by steering their flows to proprietary funds. We observe no similar effects for unaffiliated advisors. Furthermore, affiliated advisors do not significantly improve participation rates, lower administrative fees, or increase diversification. Given the increasing prevalence of advisors within 401(k) plans, our findings have relevant implications for households, plan sponsors, and policymakers.
Schlagwörter: 
401(k) plans
financial advisors
conflicts of interest
recordkeepers
JEL: 
G10
G11
J32
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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