Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/318240 
Year of Publication: 
2023
Citation: 
[Journal:] Review of Managerial Science [ISSN:] 1863-6691 [Volume:] 18 [Issue:] 10 [Publisher:] Springer [Place:] Berlin, Heidelberg [Year:] 2023 [Pages:] 2925-2951
Publisher: 
Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Abstract: 
We investigate the effect of a donation incentive tied to contributions to a public good when group members can decide on the size of their donation. An up to 20% donation of the public good was implemented either exogenously or endogenously by group members. In the Vote treatment, groups could either decide in favor of or against a donation of 20% of the public good; in the Vote Share treatment, subjects could decide on a donation share of between 0 and 20%. Results show that a large percentage of the participants vote in favor of implementing a donation share in both treatments. In groups voting in favor of a 20% donation share or endogenously implementing a high donation share in the Vote Share treatment contributions to the public good are higher compared to an exogenously implemented donation share.
Subjects: 
Donations
Decision right
Public good game
Team incentives
Laboratory experiment
Charitable giving
JEL: 
C72
C92
D64
D70
J33
M52
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

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