Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/317077 
Year of Publication: 
2023
Citation: 
[Journal:] Review of Industrial Organization [ISSN:] 1573-7160 [Volume:] 64 [Issue:] 2 [Publisher:] Springer US [Place:] New York, NY [Year:] 2023 [Pages:] 315-326
Publisher: 
Springer US, New York, NY
Abstract: 
Cooperation among rival firms raises serious skepticism among economists, policymakers, and legal experts, since it generally hurts consumers. We show that this may not be the case in an open economy with strategic foreign direct investment (FDI). Under Cournot competition, increased cooperation among firms reduces the domestic welfare, but it may benefit the consumers by attracting FDI. Under Bertrand competition with differentiated goods, increased cooperation may increase consumer surplus, and it may increase or decrease the domestic welfare by attracting FDI.
Subjects: 
Cooperation
Consumer surplus
Welfare
Foreign direct investment
JEL: 
F21
F23
L13
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.