Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/315352 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Citation: 
[Journal:] Public Choice [ISSN:] 1573-7101 [Volume:] 200 [Issue:] 1 [Publisher:] Springer US [Place:] New York, NY [Year:] 2024 [Pages:] 237-256
Publisher: 
Springer US, New York, NY
Abstract: 
I explore a previously neglected mechanism of mass mobilization in autocracies. Revolutionary leaders may deliberately provoke punishment from the incumbent regime to signal their political conviction and thus encourage citizens to identify with and support the revolutionary movement. I model the interplay of repression, criticism, and revolutionary actions as a dynamic game with incomplete information about the leader’s type. The role of the revolutionary leader is to enable people to identify with the movement by credibly embodying political change. From the incumbent’s perspective, repression turns out to be a double-edged sword. On the one hand, a severe punishment of critics increases citizens’ cost of participating in revolutionary actions. On the other hand, harsh repressions may simultaneously establish a trustworthy leader whom people want to follow in order to replace the current political regime. My results thus help explain a stylized fact, namely that revolutionary leaders sometimes need to fail before they can succeed.
Subjects: 
Revolutions
Protests
Revolutionary leader
Repression
JEL: 
D74
K42
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

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