Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/315350 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Citation: 
[Journal:] Public Choice [ISSN:] 1573-7101 [Volume:] 201 [Issue:] 1 [Publisher:] Springer US [Place:] New York, NY [Year:] 2024 [Pages:] 61-81
Publisher: 
Springer US, New York, NY
Abstract: 
Some citizens place a high value on making decisions for themselves. Other citizens are happy to delegate decisions to a government agency. Such differences in political attitudes to paternalism can be explained in a strict rational-choice model with citizens’ heterogeneous tastes in the economic sphere. Citizens with more eccentric tastes and with high decision-making abilities tend to favor a libertarian regime. If majority preferences matter, heterogeneity in economic preferences and analytical abilities can also explain whether the political regime is more paternalist or more libertarian. As decision-making skills are a learnable capability, the strategic complementarity of individuals’ investments in analytical skills in the context of political regime outcomes suggests a feedback mechanism that can cause multiple expectations equilibria. Both a libertarian regime or a paternalist regime can emerge.
Subjects: 
Paternalism
Libertarianism
Autonomous decision-making
Majoritarian decisions
Decision skills
Formation of decision capabilities
JEL: 
D18
D78
H11
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

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