Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/314965 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Citation: 
[Journal:] International Journal of Game Theory [ISSN:] 1432-1270 [Volume:] 53 [Issue:] 2 [Publisher:] Springer [Place:] Berlin, Heidelberg [Year:] 2024 [Pages:] 299-324
Publisher: 
Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Abstract: 
We present a test of the two most established reciprocity models, an intention factor model and a reference value model. We test characteristic elements of each model in a series of twelve mini-ultimatum games. Results from online experiments show major differences between actual behavior and predictions of both models: the distance of actual offers to the proposed reference value provides a poor measure for the kindness of offers, while a comparison of offers with extreme offers as suggested by the intention factor model makes offers indiscriminable in richer settings. We discuss possible combinations of both models better describing our observations.
Subjects: 
Experiments
Intentions
Mini-ultimatum game
Reference value
Reciprocity models
JEL: 
C52
C72
C91
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

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