Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/314965 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2024
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] International Journal of Game Theory [ISSN:] 1432-1270 [Volume:] 53 [Issue:] 2 [Publisher:] Springer Berlin Heidelberg [Place:] Berlin/Heidelberg [Year:] 2024 [Pages:] 299-324
Verlag: 
Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin/Heidelberg
Zusammenfassung: 
Abstract We present a test of the two most established reciprocity models, an intention factor model and a reference value model. We test characteristic elements of each model in a series of twelve mini-ultimatum games. Results from online experiments show major differences between actual behavior and predictions of both models: the distance of actual offers to the proposed reference value provides a poor measure for the kindness of offers, while a comparison of offers with extreme offers as suggested by the intention factor model makes offers indiscriminable in richer settings. We discuss possible combinations of both models better describing our observations.
Schlagwörter: 
Experiments
Intentions
Mini-ultimatum game
Reference value
Reciprocity models
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Sonstige Angaben: 
C52;C72;C91
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Dokumentart: 
Article
Dokumentversion: 
Published Version
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