Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/314586 
Year of Publication: 
2025
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 17689
Publisher: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Abstract: 
I investigate the intra-household labor and resource allocation consequences of an employment guarantee targeting rural households in India. The guarantee insures household earnings, replacing women as added workers and shutting down a motive for saving. Despite sizable program-job take-up, the guarantee decreases participation in other working activities, and, thus, the labor force participation of married women and total time worked by their husbands. The guarantee accounts for up to 30% of a recent countrywide decrease in rural female labor force participation. Though it increases household consumption, the guarantee reduces the command of household earnings by women, and, thereby, their wellbeing.
Subjects: 
added-worker effect
family insurance
female labor force participation
guaranteed employment
intra-household bargaining power
poverty
JEL: 
I31
I32
J12
J13
O12
O15
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
493.05 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.