Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/314510 
Year of Publication: 
2025
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 17613
Publisher: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Abstract: 
This study estimates and decomposes recruitment elasticity, a key measure of employer market power, across job-matching stages using data from Japan's largest job-matching intermediary. On average, recruitment elasticity is negative but not statistically significantly different from zero. However, this masks heterogeneity across stages. The negative elasticity arises from lower-wage workers avoiding higher-wage vacancies during inquiry. Posted wages positively influence application, interview attendance, and offer acceptance decisions, with elasticity decreasing in that order. Other important patterns are also examined.
Subjects: 
market power of employers
monopsony
job matching intermediary
recruitment elasticity
inquiry
application
interview
offer
control function approach
JEL: 
J20
J30
J42
J64
L13
L40
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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