Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/313382 
Year of Publication: 
2022
Citation: 
[Journal:] Review of Economic Design [ISSN:] 1434-4750 [Publisher:] Springer [Place:] Berlin, Heidelberg [Year:] 2022 [Pages:] 1-31
Publisher: 
Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Abstract: 
We characterise the strategic equivalence among k -winner contests using simultaneous and sequential winner selection. We test this prediction of strategic equivalence using a series of laboratory experiments, contrasting 1-winner contests with 2-winner contests, varying in the latter whether the outcome is revealed sequentially or in a single stage. We find that in the long run, average bidding levels are similar across strategically-equivalent contests. However, adaptation in 2-winner contests is slower and less systematic, which is consistent with the property that simultaneous winner selection results in outcomes that are more random than in the 1-winner case.
Subjects: 
Lottery contest
Multi-winner contests
Learning
Experiment
Strategic equivalence
JEL: 
C72
C91
D72
D82
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

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