Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/313382 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2022
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Review of Economic Design [ISSN:] 1434-4750 [Publisher:] Springer Berlin Heidelberg [Year:] 2022 [Pages:] 1-31
Verlag: 
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Zusammenfassung: 
Abstract We characterise the strategic equivalence among k -winner contests using simultaneous and sequential winner selection. We test this prediction of strategic equivalence using a series of laboratory experiments, contrasting 1-winner contests with 2-winner contests, varying in the latter whether the outcome is revealed sequentially or in a single stage. We find that in the long run, average bidding levels are similar across strategically-equivalent contests. However, adaptation in 2-winner contests is slower and less systematic, which is consistent with the property that simultaneous winner selection results in outcomes that are more random than in the 1-winner case.
Schlagwörter: 
Lottery contest
Multi-winner contests
Learning
Experiment
Strategic equivalence
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Sonstige Angaben: 
C72;C91;D72;D82
Creative-Commons-Lizenz: 
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Dokumentart: 
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Dokumentversion: 
Published Version
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