Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/31332
Authors: 
Schipper, Burkhard C.
Eichberger, Jürgen
Kelsey, David H.
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
Working papers // University of California, Department of Economics 06,27
Abstract: 
We report on an experiment in which subjects choose actions in strategic games with either strategic complements or substitutes against a granny, a game theorist or ther subjects. The games are selected in order to test predictions on the comparative statics of equilibrium with respect to changes in strategic ambiguity. We find that subjects face higher ambiguity while playing against the granny than playing against the game theorist if we assume that subjects are ambiguity averse. Moreover, under the same assumption, subjects choose more secure actions in games more prone to ambiguity which is in line with the predictions.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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