Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/313195 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2023
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Economic Theory Bulletin [ISSN:] 2196-1093 [Volume:] 11 [Issue:] 2 [Publisher:] Springer International Publishing [Year:] 2023 [Pages:] 255-275
Verlag: 
Springer International Publishing
Zusammenfassung: 
Abstract We analyze Stackelberg leadership in a first-price auction. Leadership is induced by an information system, represented by a spy, that leaks one bidder’s bid before others choose their bids. However, the leader may secretly revise his bid with some probability; therefore, the leaked bid is only an imperfect signal. Whereas leadership with perfect commitment exclusively benefits the follower, imperfect commitment yields a collusive outcome, even if the likelihood that the leader may revise his bid is arbitrarily small. This collusive impact shows up in all equilibria and is strongest in the unique pooling equilibrium which is also payoff dominant.
Schlagwörter: 
Auctions
Tacit collusion
Espionage
Second-mover advantage
Signaling
Incomplete information
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Sonstige Angaben: 
L12;L13;L41;D43;D44;D82
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Dokumentart: 
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Dokumentversion: 
Published Version
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