Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/313161 
Year of Publication: 
2022
Citation: 
[Journal:] Experimental Economics [ISSN:] 1573-6938 [Volume:] 25 [Issue:] 4 [Publisher:] Springer US [Place:] New York, NY [Year:] 2022 [Pages:] 1173-1201
Publisher: 
Springer US, New York, NY
Abstract: 
The paper examines whether an institution has a differing impact on cooperation if it is introduced by a representative of the affected subjects rather than exogenously imposed. The experimental design controls for selection effects arising from the endogenous policy choice. The treatment varies whether the decision-maker is elected or randomly appointed. There is evidence of a large democracy premium in the sense that endogenously chosen institutions lead to more cooperation than identical exogenous institutions, but only if the group leader is democratically chosen. Especially the subjects who initially did not prefer the policy are more likely to cooperate if it was brought about by an elected representative. There is no democracy premium for randomly appointed group leaders.
Subjects: 
Laboratory experiment
Representative democracy
Collective decision-making
Social dilemma
Legitimacy
JEL: 
C9
D02
D72
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

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