Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/312808 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2022
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Economic Theory [ISSN:] 1432-0479 [Volume:] 75 [Issue:] 2 [Publisher:] Springer [Place:] Berlin, Heidelberg [Year:] 2022 [Pages:] 567-590
Verlag: 
Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Zusammenfassung: 
A seller of an item faces a potential buyer whose valuation of the item depends on two private signals. It is well known that when there are informational externalities and the buyer's private signals arrive all at once, it is impossible to implement an efficient sale. I show that if the buyer's private signals arrive over time, then the seller can implement an efficient sale even in the presence of informational externalities. Specifically, I present a novel condition on the relationship between the buyer's valuation and the social welfare that is necessary and sufficient for efficient sequential implementation.
Schlagwörter: 
Efficient mechanisms
Sequential screening
Efficient privatization
Interdependent valuations
Multidimensional information
Informational externalities
JEL: 
D42
D44
D62
D82
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
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Dokumentart: 
Article
Dokumentversion: 
Published Version

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