Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/31222
Authors: 
Ben-Sasson, Eli
Tauman Kalai, Adam
Kalai, Ehud
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion paper // Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1439
Abstract: 
A central question in game theory and artificial intelligence is how a rational agent should behave in a complex environment, given that it cannot perform unbounded computations. We study strategic aspects of this question by formulating a simple model of a game with additional costs (computational or otherwise) for each strategy. First we connect this to zero-sum games, proving a counter-intuitive generalization of the classic min-max theorem to zero-sum games with the addition of strategy costs. We then show that potential games with strategy costs remain potential games. Both zero-sum and potential games with strategy costs maintain a very appealing property: simple learning dynamics converge to equilibrium.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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