Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/311986 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 17547
Publisher: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Abstract: 
We use data from a platform that centralizes a day care matching process. We estimate parents' preferences and nursery priorities by analyzing parents' rank-ordered lists and nurseries' acceptance decisions. We account for strategic behavior by using a novel estimation approach inspired by the dynamic discrete choice framework. We use the estimates to evaluate centralized matching policies tailored to the day care setting. We compare mechanisms and assess the effects of subsidies, increased capacity, and affirmative action. We find that affirmative action policies are crucial for boosting the participation of disadvantaged children, though they increase segregation due to location-based preferences.
Subjects: 
day care
affirmative action
segregation
centralized matching markets
CCP estimation
JEL: 
C61
D82
I24
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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