Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/31193 
Year of Publication: 
2007
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper No. 1448
Publisher: 
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Evanston, IL
Abstract: 
The property of an allocation rule to be implementable in dominant strategies by a unique payment scheme is called revenue equivalence. In this paper we give a characterization of revenue equivalence based on a graph theoretic interpretation of the incentive compatibility constraints. The characterization holds for any (possibly in¯nite) outcome space and many of the known results about revenue equivalence are immediate consequences.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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