Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/311868 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2023
Citation: 
[Journal:] Journal of Business Economics [ISSN:] 1861-8928 [Volume:] 94 [Issue:] 3 [Publisher:] Springer [Place:] Berlin, Heidelberg [Year:] 2023 [Pages:] 525-541
Publisher: 
Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Abstract: 
The new Digital Market Act (DMA) of the European Union imposes stricter rules on gatekeeper platforms. While this affects only a few very large platforms, the discussion surrounding the implementation of the DMA offers valuable insights into the strategic behaviors of those gatekeeper platforms. A gatekeeper platform, for example, may enter its platform as a supplier, which may hurt existing third-party suppliers and restrict fair competition on the platform. This paper flips the academic discussion on whether marketplace owners should be allowed to sell on their marketplaces. It illustrates why this behavior is profitable for gatekeepers and how marketplace owners can apply this knowledge to improve their business models. The paper identifies five situations in which becoming a supplier in one's marketplace can be profitable, but it also proposes alternative solutions to entering the market.
Subjects: 
Digital platforms
Digital Market Act
Self-preferencing
Market-entry
Marketplaces
JEL: 
M21
M30
M13
L26
L15
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.