Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/311686 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2024
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ISER Discussion Paper No. 1271
Verlag: 
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER), Osaka
Zusammenfassung: 
In a second-price sequential auction with both global and local bidders, we explore the optimal order for selling heterogeneous goods to maximize efficiency or revenue. Our findings indicate that selling the good with very small variance (almost-zero variance) first yields higher revenue, while selling it second results in an efficient outcome with probability almost 1. We link the optimal selling order to the likelihood of various inefficient outcomes. Specifically, selling the good with small variance first increases the probability of ex-post loss for the global bidder, boosting the seller's revenue at the expense of overall social welfare.
Schlagwörter: 
Sequential Auctions
Multi-dimensional values
Simulations
JEL: 
D44
D82
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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