Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/311640 
Year of Publication: 
2025
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper No. 03.2025
Publisher: 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milano
Abstract: 
This paper studies how competition between groups affects cooperation. In the control condition, pairs of subjects play an indefinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game without external competition. In the treatment, two pairs compete against each other. No monetary rewards are tied to winning, isolating the bare impact of competition. In the treatment, cooperation increases by 16 percentage points. Strategies estimation shows a shift from selfish strategies (Always Defect) to cooperative ones (Grim Trigger). A theoretical model provides a rationale for the experimental results.
Subjects: 
Competition
Cooperation
Prisoner's Dilemma
Repeated game
JEL: 
C73
C92
D81
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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