Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/311630 
Year of Publication: 
2025
Series/Report no.: 
Memorandum No. 01/2025
Publisher: 
University of Oslo, Department of Economics, Oslo
Abstract: 
Voluntary contributions to public goods have been shown to increase when contribution behaviors become observable by peers. We examine the effect of social pressure on moral behaviour, using a framework distinguishing explicitly between observable and nonobservable forms of contribution. We show that even with moral motivation and social pressure, there is underprovision of the public good. Making some contribution behaviors observable does increase effort, but also causes misallocation of effort between observable and non-observable effort types. The latter negative effect can possibly outweigh the positive effect of increased effort on public good provision.
Subjects: 
Moral motivation
Behavioural economics
Warm glow
Modeling visible altruism
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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