Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/311308 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2025
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
I4R Discussion Paper Series No. 203
Verlag: 
Institute for Replication (I4R), s.l.
Zusammenfassung: 
Weschle (2024) examines the effect of UK legislators taking private sector jobs while holding office on their parliamentary behaviour. The published analysis employs two-way fixed effects and difference-in-differences as an identification strategy. In that analysis, which we were able to computationally reproduce from the data and code provided, the author found that holding a private sector job meant that: (i) overall MPs are 0.1% more likely to rebel against their party, with most of that effect driven by Conservative MPs who are 0.2% more likely to rebel but overall there is a minimal impact on rebellion and this is significant at the 10% level (p 0.069). The original results also show (ii) that 'moonlighting' MPs are also likely to attend more votes, estimated at 2.2% more compared to pre-employment levels (b 0.022, se 0.008, p 0.008), with the result again driven by Conservative MPs (b 0.028, se 0.011, p 0.010). The final set of results show that (iii) overall MPs who are employed are statistically significantly more likely to ask parliamentary questions (b 0.375, se 0.079, p 0.00001, with the effect again concentrated in Conservative MPs who were 60% more likely to ask a parliamentary question following employment (b 0.455, se 0.098, p 0.00001). Overall, the replication package was well-organized, and the analysis could be fully reproduced using the provided cleaned data. Further, the main outcomes proved consistent across a number of robustness checks.
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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