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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2023
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] International Journal of Game Theory [ISSN:] 1432-1270 [Volume:] 53 [Issue:] 2 [Publisher:] Springer [Place:] Berlin, Heidelberg [Year:] 2023 [Pages:] 373-421
Verlag: 
Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper considers pure strategy Nash equilibria of non-cooperative legislative bargaining models. In contrast to existing legislative bargaining models, we derive legislators behavior from stochastic utility maximization. This approach allows us to prove the existence of a stationary Pure Local and Global Nash Equilibrium under rather general settings. The mathematical proof is based on a fixed point argument, which can also be used as a numerical method to determine an equilibrium. We characterize the equilibrium outcome as a lottery of legislators' proposals and prove a Mean Voter Theorem , i.e., proposals result dimension-by-dimension as a weighted mean of legislators' ideal points and are Pareto-optimal. Based on a simple example, we illustrate different logic of our model compared to mixed strategy equilibrium of the legislative bargaining model suggested by Banks and Duggan (Am Polit Sci Rev 94(1):73–88. https://doi.org/10.2307/2586381 , 2000).
Schlagwörter: 
Legislative Bargaining
Local and global Nash equilibria
Non-cooperative Game Theory
JEL: 
C72
C73
C78
D72
D78
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Dokumentart: 
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Dokumentversion: 
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