Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/311221 
Year of Publication: 
2022
Citation: 
[Journal:] Comparative Economic Studies [ISSN:] 1478-3320 [Volume:] 64 [Issue:] 4 [Publisher:] Palgrave Macmillan [Place:] London [Year:] 2022 [Pages:] 681-709
Publisher: 
Palgrave Macmillan, London
Abstract: 
We study empirically whether the allocation of discretionary grants across Spanish regions is related to the number of swing voters and loyal voters of the ruling party. We estimate the number of swing and loyal voters from survey data. When estimating the number of swing voters, we account in a novel way for the two-dimensional ideological space and multiparty competition. We find that regions with more loyal voters of the ruling party received more grants per capita. Partisan alignment of regional governments also matters over a part of the studied period since the regions where the socialist party of the central government was a member of the regional government received more grants.
Subjects: 
Distributive politics
Discretionary grants
Swing voters
Loyal voters
Partisan alignment
Spain
JEL: 
H5
H77
O1
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.