Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/310982 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2023
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Journal of Banking Regulation [ISSN:] 1750-2071 [Volume:] 25 [Issue:] 2 [Publisher:] Palgrave Macmillan [Place:] London [Year:] 2023 [Pages:] 197-208
Verlag: 
Palgrave Macmillan, London
Zusammenfassung: 
This article analyses the optimal punishment structure set by a regulator in banking markets under asymmetric information. Relying on a theoretical model, we analyse whether a decreasing, constant, or increasing sanction scheme deters potentially repeated offences in banking. We find that an increasing punishment structure is efficient in reducing gambling bank behaviour. This holds if and only if the regulator's detection probability is low or the amount gambled by the bank, if it would cheat, is high. With this paper, we provide justification for the current policy practice.
Schlagwörter: 
Banking
Excessive risk
Moral hazard
Enforcement
Repeat offenders
JEL: 
D82
G21
K42
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
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Dokumentart: 
Article
Dokumentversion: 
Published Version

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