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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2022
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Politische Vierteljahresschrift [ISSN:] 1862-2860 [Volume:] 63 [Issue:] 3 [Publisher:] Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH [Place:] Wiesbaden [Year:] 2022 [Pages:] 383-404
Verlag: 
Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, Wiesbaden
Zusammenfassung: 
Governments often reallocate administrative units among ministries to meet parties' office and policy demands or to increase political control over the bureaucracy. How do such reforms affect the work motivation and performance of ministerial bureaucrats? Based on self-determination theory, this paper expects detrimental effects on bureaucrats' ability to meet the basic psychological needs of competence, autonomy, and relatedness, which should reduce work motivation. This negative effect should be weaker when bureaucrats perceive a substantive rationale and long-term benefits of the reform compared to changes perceived as driven solely by party-political goals. We find support for these expectations in interviews with top-level ministerial bureaucrats in Germany working in two policy areas (public construction and consumer protection) that were frequently reallocated between ministries. The study shows that organizational change also affects work motivation among top-level bureaucrats and has broader implications for understanding civil servants' motivations and performance as well as unintended consequences of public sector reforms.
Schlagwörter: 
Institutional reform
Ministerial bureaucracy
Self-determination theory
Interviews
Germany
Institutionenreform
Ministerialbürokratie
Deutschland
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