Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/309878 
Year of Publication: 
2022
Citation: 
[Journal:] The Review of International Organizations [ISSN:] 1559-744X [Volume:] 18 [Issue:] 4 [Publisher:] Springer US [Place:] New York, NY [Year:] 2022 [Pages:] 631-666
Publisher: 
Springer US, New York, NY
Abstract: 
Why do some international organizations (IO) accrete delegated authority over time while in others delegation is static or declines? We hypothesize that the dynamics of delegation are shaped by an IO's founding contract. IOs rooted in an open-ended contract have the capacity to discover cooperation over time: as new problems arise these IOs can adopt new policies or strengthen collaboration in existing areas. This, in turn, triggers a demand for delegation. However, this logic is mediated by the political regime of the IO. In predominantly democratic IOs, delegation is constrained by politicization which intensifies as an IO's policy portfolio broadens. These claims are tested using an updated version of the Measure of International Authority dataset covering 41 regional IOs between 1950 and 2019. Controlling for alternative explanations and addressing potential endogeneity across a range of model specifications, we find robust support for our argument.
Subjects: 
International organization
Regional organization
Delegation
Institutional design
Politicization
Endogenous change
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

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