Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/309509 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2022
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] International Tax and Public Finance [ISSN:] 1573-6970 [Volume:] 30 [Issue:] 4 [Publisher:] Springer US [Place:] New York, NY [Year:] 2022 [Pages:] 1002-1035
Verlag: 
Springer US, New York, NY
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper investigates firms' responses to threshold-dependent intensity of tax enforcement. We use administrative tax return data over the entire population of German firms and exploit industry variation in firm size thresholds applied by the tax administration. In our setting, each threshold marks a considerable spike in audit intensity and hence should create strong incentives to bunch below the threshold. However, we find no such effect in our large sample analysis. We attribute this empirical observation to optimization costs, particularly to the costs associated with the operational implementation of size management and to information costs. Our paper adds to the emerging field of studies on potential distortions created by threshold-dependent firm regulation. The findings are also relevant for policymakers, as they suggest that the specific design of threshold-dependent policies might allow governments to increase the efficiency of tax audits without distorting the firm size distribution.
Schlagwörter: 
Tax enforcement
Size-dependent regulation
Bunching
Administrative data
Germany
JEL: 
H26
H32
K42
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Dokumentart: 
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Dokumentversion: 
Published Version

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