Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/308621 
Year of Publication: 
2023
Citation: 
[Journal:] Economic Theory Bulletin [ISSN:] 2196-1093 [Volume:] 11 [Issue:] 1 [Publisher:] Springer International Publishing [Place:] Cham [Year:] 2023 [Pages:] 131-151
Publisher: 
Springer International Publishing, Cham
Abstract: 
We study a model in which agents with single-peaked preferences can participate in a costly voting procedure to determine the value of a one-dimensional variable. We show that, for all positive participation costs and all profiles of individual preferences, there exists a unique equilibrium outcome with one single participant whenever the voting rule is strategy-proof, anonymous, and responsive in the sense that the outcome reacts to a unanimous move of the votes of all agents in the same direction; moreover, the single participant is always one of the 'extremist' voters, i.e. either one with the lowest or one with the highest peak. While this uncovers a strong tension between strategy-proofness and participation for all deterministic voting rules on the single-peaked domain (just as in the case of an unrestricted domain), there are simple probabilistic and strategy-proof voting rules that induce full participation in equilibrium.
Subjects: 
Costly voting
Strategy-proofness
Generalized medians
Participation
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

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