Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/30754 
Full metadata record
Appears in Collections:
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorSöderberg, Magnusen
dc.date.accessioned2010-03-11-
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T08:26:49Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T08:26:49Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/30754-
dc.description.abstractThis paper investigates to what extent unregulated local monopolies attempt not to evoke the introduction of a formal price regulation by conforming to customers' and authorities' expectations. It is argued that utilities can meet expectations by setting prices that imitate neighbours' prices. The empirical evaluation rests on a cross-sectional data set representing all Swedish district heating utilities, and on a flexible nonlinear IV specification. It is found that while utilities' price setting schemes are insensitive to customer complaints, they are significantly influenced by the passive monitoring by authorities. The spillover effect from the 5-6 closest neighbours is around 40 %.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x2973en
dc.subject.jelL11en
dc.subject.jelL33en
dc.subject.jelL97en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordregulatory threaten
dc.subject.keywordspatial correlationen
dc.subject.keywordpriceen
dc.subject.keyworddistrict heatingen
dc.subject.keywordSwedenen
dc.subject.stwHeizkraftwerken
dc.subject.stwBetriebliche Preispolitiken
dc.subject.stwRegionale Preisstrukturen
dc.subject.stwErwartungstheorieen
dc.subject.stwStaatliche Preispolitiken
dc.subject.stwSchwedenen
dc.titleInformal benchmarks as a source of regulatory threat in unregulated utility sectors-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn620952970en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

Files in This Item:
File
Size
162.55 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.